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Introduction
A large literature has focused on what Kym Anderson (2009) refers to as "distortions to agricultural incentives". A key element of these distortions is how government interventions cause prices to diverge from "market prices" or "equilibrium prices" and thus distort incentives for consumers and producers in their respective decisions, causing inefficiencies throughout the economy. The basic model behind the literature on price and market distortions is one with static supply and demand equations where consumption and production adjust in response to long term prices.
However in recent years, much of the discussion on global agricultural and food prices has focused on the, often short-run, volatility of these prices. It is argued that such short-run volatility of prices is causing inefficiencies in consumption and prices as it is difficult for consumers and producers to make optimal decisions in such volatile environments (Barrett et al., 2013) . A typical example is the problem of farmers to plan their output if prices are volatile and uncertainty is large. This is not only an issue for producers and consumers but also for governments.
As is well known, all over the world, politicians and governments are regularly under pressure from agricultural producers and food consumers to intervene in agricultural and food markets. In the longer run, this has led to a series of "patterns" of policy distortions in agricultural and food markets (Kreuger et al., 1991; Anderson et al., 2013) . In recent years, many governments have intervened in an attempt to reduce short run price fluctuations with global food price spikes (Barrett, 2014; Naylor, 2014; Pinstrup-Andersen 2014) 1 . These government interventions have often been ad hoc -resembling what Swinnen (1996) called "fire brigade policy-making" when governments are confronted with shocks in the external environment.
Many economists and policy advisors have been critical of these attempts, criticizing governments for (a) being ineffective, (b) causing distortions in the economy, and (c) reinforcing price fluctuations, etc. (Anderson et al., 2013) .
However, at the same time many economists and advisors point at the importance of reducing price volatility based on efficiency gains FAO and OECD, 2011; Prakash, 2011; World Bank, 2012 Key findings of our paper are (a) that several countries have been able to reduce (short run) price volatility in the domestic markets while at the same time allowing structural (medium and long term) price changes to pass through to producers and consumers; (b) that there is a trade-off between volatility and distortions in situations with limited policy options for welfare maximizing governments; and (c) that even when explicitly taking into account this trade-off (and the benefits of reducing volatility) that many countries (governments) are far removed from the optimal distortion-volatility (DV) combination and that there is, thus, much room for policy improvement.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents two cases of important staple food markets where governments have significantly reduced (short run) price volatility in the domestic markets while at the same time allowing structural (medium and long term) price changes pass through. Section 3 develops a conceptual model of the trade-off between distortions and volatility for a welfare maximizing government.
Section 4 links the theoretical framework to empirical indicators. Section 5 presents empirical indicators of the distortions-volatility (DV) trade-off for staple food markets and develops a single "efficiency" indicator. Section 6 presents the empirical results on distortions in staple food markets in developing and emerging countries. Section 7 concludes.
Trading of Volatility and Distortions: Two Examples
To start, we will illustrate the key issue with two cases of government interventions in important food markets over the past decade. The first example is that of rice markets and prices in China; the second example is that of wheat markets and prices in Pakistan. An obvious question is whether these two cases are exceptional or that they represent a larger pattern of government interventions in staple food crops in emerging and developing countries. In this paper we will provide evidence from more countries using quantitative indicators of price distortions and volatility. However, before turning to the empirical indicators of price distortions and volatility, we first develop a conceptual framework to interpret the empirical observations.
Conceptual Framework: Social Optimum with Adjustment Costs
The model
Consider a small open economy with one good: "food". The domestic price of food in period t is and the price on the world market is . Define consumer utility as
where the first term is the consumer's indirect utility of prices 3 .
The second term represents the price adjustment cost which is zero if prices are stable and increasing and negative otherwise 4 . The costs are a convex function of the difference in prices in period t and the previous period t-1 (with ≥ 0 ). Our specification is similar to that of Nickell (1985) and Ivanic and Martin (2014) who assume that consumers face a quadratic cost of deviating from the previous price level.
There are several mechanisms through which such adjustments may imply costs for consumers. One is through the need to update and adjust stocks and ingredients for 3 For simplicity we assume that (•) is a function of current prices. 4 In the model we did not include uncertainties of future price changes and the impact of these price risks. How risk in the absence of insurance markets may lead to a solution where free trade is pareto inferior is shown by Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) . This could be an alternative conceptual argument for price interventions.
processors and retailers. Menu costs can be an additional source of adjustment costs.
Menu costs should be interpreted as the fixed cost related to the price adjustment process: a restaurant has to print new menus, a food processing company has to inform salesmen of the new prices, a company might pay a price for upsetting customers, etc.
As shown by Mankiw (1985) these small menu costs can create price rigidities as the producer will not adjust its prices when the menu costs are higher than the additional profits.
The third term is the consumer's share in tax revenue or the share in subsidy Producer utility is defined as
where ( ) are profits in period t 5 . The second term represents a quadratic cost for producers of deviating from its previous price level, specified similarly as for consumers (with ≥ 0), and the third term is the producer's share in tax revenue or subsidy expenditures (with 0 ≤ ≤ 1 ). The sum of the shares is equal to one ( + = 1) as we assume that the total tax revenues or budgetary costs are divided among consumers and producers. With these specifications, price volatility hurts both consumers and producers, but the effect may be different (as and differ).
The government can influence consumer and producer welfare by intervening in food markets. For simplicity we assume that the government can set the domestic price (and that this is the only price that consumers face). We consider the governments optimal choice under different scenarios of government objectives:
maximizing social welfare with and without price volatility.
At time t, the social welfare maximizing domestic price * is determined by:
The first order condition is:
Using Roy's identity ′ ( ) = − ( ) and Hotelling's lemma ′ ( ) = ( ) the first order condition can be written as 6 :
Balancing volatility and distortions in social welfare
As a benchmark let us first consider the optimum without volatility concerns. The optimality condition for ⋕ , the price which maximizes (3) when there is no volatility -or when nobody cares about volatility (i.e. when = 0, = 0) is:
6 Using the same specification as in Ivanic and Martin (2014) and Nickell (1985) , the equivalent specification would be ( * − )( + ) = −( + )( * − −1 ) − ( * ) + ( * ). and represents how much consumers and producers care about distortions but unlike our specification they do not sum up to 1. The full derivation of the model with the specification as in Ivanic and Martin (2014) and Nickell (1985) can be requested from the authors.
The difference between conditions (5) and (6) is the right hand side term of (5). Without volatility concerns the social welfare maximizing government will set the domestic price where it minimizes distortions, which are captured by the left hand side term of (5) and (6). This is at the world market price. Hence,
However with volatility concerns there is a trade-off for the government. Only in the case that = −1 , i.e. when there is zero volatility, will the government choose * = , the non-distortive price. In all other cases, it will chose a different price.
More specifically,
This can also be seen from rewriting condition (5) as follows: the social optimum will be to partially offset the price change. In other words, governments will raise domestic prices in response to global price rises, but because this increases distortions it only does so partially -and similarly for price declines.
This is illustrated in figure 3 . Figure 3 shows the optimal price setting for 3 different levels of ( = 0, = 1 2 , = 1). In the extreme cases, the domestic price follows either the world market price (if = 0) or the price is set by the government such that there is zero-volatility ( = 1), i.e. * = −1 . In the case where = 1 2 , the socially optimal domestic price follows the trend of the world market price but is less volatile than the world market price.
The extent of the adjustment will depend on the marginal increase in production and consumption distortions caused by deviations of the price from the world market price (captured by ′ − ′, which reflect the elasticities of supply and demand) and the preferences for stability ( + ). Only when the preferences for stability are zero ( = 0) will there be full price adjustments. When the marginal impact on distortions is larger ( ′ − ′ larger and thus larger) adjustments will be smaller -and vice versa.
Linking the Theoretical Variables to Empirical Indicators
To relate these theoretical results to empirical indicators, we can express the equilibrium condition as a relationship between price distortions and volatility.
Condition (5) can be written as But as distortions should be measured in absolute values (negative and positive value distortions should be considered equally distortive), figure 5 present the optimal DV combinations of the absolute values of the domestic volatility and distortions for different values of ( ) for a given price shock. The choice of the government will be more towards the North-West with a higher  (lower ). With lower  (higher ), i.e.
higher marginal distortions and less preference for stability, the choice will be more towards the South-East of the line.
Empirical Indicators of the DV Trade-off
We now present empirical indicators of this trade-off for various countries over the past decade. In section 2 we discussed how the Chinese and Pakistani government appeared to have chosen a combination of limited domestic volatility with distortions. We now present comparative evidence from more countries using the conceptual framework we developed in section 3.
Data on staple food prices
Our analysis uses monthly data for wheat, rice, and maize over the period from January 
Measuring volatility
There are different measures of volatility (for an extensive overview see Piot-Lepetit and M'Barek, 2011). These measures can be divided in two kinds of volatility measures (Huchet-Bourdon, 2011): those that measure the historical volatility and those that provide a measure for the implicit future volatility. In this paper, we focus on the measurement of historical volatility.
Within the historical price evaluation literature, several measurements have been proposed. First, volatility can be measured using the coefficient of variation and is defined as the ratio of the standard variation s over the mean µ for a given time period.
= (12)
There are two disadvantages related to this measure: (1) the measured volatility returns a positive value when the prices remain constant over time (Huchet-Bourdon, 2011) and (2) the estimated variability and the standard variation s approaches infinity when the covered time period becomes longer (Minot, 2014 ).
An alternative measure is the standard variation of returns, where the return can be defined as (1) the percentage change in prices (FAO and OECD, 2011) or similarly (2) as the difference in the logarithm of prices (Gilbert and Morgan, 2010; Minot, 2014) .
Formally, the volatility measure can be expressed as: In contrast to the coefficient of variation, the standard variation of return will be zero when prices follow a constant time trend, but it has the drawback that it does not take into account that most of the agricultural commodity price series exhibit some form of a trend. For example, when the price increase is constant over time the standard deviation of the return will report a positive value. To avoid that trend movements are included in the volatility measure, it is sometimes recommended to use a de-trended series to compute volatility. De-trending, however, requires (strong) assumptions about the nature of the underlying trend. Moreover, the choice of the de-trending technique determines the volatility measure 10 . Gilbert and Morgan (2010) argue that many economists avoid this issue by measuring volatility as the standard deviation of the difference in logarithmic prices.
We follow this approach and measure price volatility as the standard deviation of the differences in logarithmic prices.
10 For example, Cuddy and Della Valle (1978) developed the 'corrected' coefficient of variation which assumes a linear trend = √1 − 2 with CV the coefficient of variation and R 2 the coefficient of determination of the linear trend regression.
Measuring distortions
The price distortions caused by governments is the deviation between the domestic price and the world market price. The measure of distortion is calculated as the average of the absolute difference between the domestic and international price at each point in time.
The distortions-volatility frontier
To evaluate policy choices of the different countries in terms of their real outcomes in volatility and distortions, we will construct the empirical equivalent of the distortionsvolatility (DV) trade-off frontier as developed in section 3 (see figure 5 ). The DV frontier represents the optimal trade-off for the government between different levels of volatility and the degree of distortion in the absence of lobby groups and for a given world market price. If a country's trade-off between volatility and distortions is an element of the frontier, the government's policy is "efficient" from this DV perspective.
If not, the distance between the outcome of the government policy and the frontier will represent possible efficiency improvements that can be made by the government.
The empirical DV frontier is constructed as the line between two extreme cases.
The first point (on the horizontal axis) represents the volatility of the world market price when there are no distortions. This point is represented by V(D=0) in figures 6 to 8 and is empirical equivalence of the point ( = 0, = 0) on the theoretical DV line in figure   5 . The second point (on the vertical axis) represents the minimum deviation from the world market price when there is no volatility. This point is represented by D(V=0) in figures 6 to 8 and is the empirical equivalence of the point ( = 1, = −∞) in figure   5 .
Measuring inefficiency in a DV trade-off framework
To get one single estimator to measure the distance to the DV frontier, we will estimate the "efficiency" of each observed government policy combination using a technique known as data envelopment analysis (DEA) 11 . The data envelopment analysis is a nonparametric method that estimates the efficiency of the different countries' policies using the following linear programming calculation:
where denotes the observed volatility in a country (as measured in equation 21), is the observed distortion (as measured in equation 22) and DV the distance to the DV frontier.
DV Trade-off and Inefficiency in Staple Food Markets in Developing and

Emerging countries
DV trade-off and classification of countries
Figures 6 to 8 illustrate the empirically measured trade-off between price distortions and volatility for wheat, rice and maize. Each point represents a country's choice between efficiency and stability.
There are also two additional points in each figure : (a) the zero distortion point "V(D=0)" on the horizontal axis that represents the volatility of the international price 11 The Data Envelopment Analysis was first developed by Farrell (1957) and has been widely applied in estimating efficiency in agricultural production (e.g. Mathijs and Swinnen, 2001; Brümmer, 2001; Latruffe et al., 2004; Piesse et al., 1996) and (b) the zero volatility point "D(V=0)" on the vertical axis which is the minimum distortion of the domestic price when there is no volatility. The line that connects both points in figures 6 to 8 is the empirical equivalent of the theoretical DV line in figure   5 . The dotted vertical and horizontal lines on the figures go through the zero distortions and zero volatility points such that we get four quadrants.
The countries in the South-West quadrant have done better than the zero distortions point in terms of volatility and better than the zero volatility point in terms of distortions. The cost of the distortion caused by their divergence from the international price to reduce volatility is rather limited as it is lower than the world price with no volatility. Figures 6 to 8 show that several countries are in (or close to) the (best) South-West quadrant. This is the case for China, Sri Lanka and Pakistan for rice;
for Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and Brazil for wheat; for Thailand, Brazil and South Africa for maize. However it is also obvious that the majority of the countries is in the other quadrants.
In the North-West quadrant countries perform better in terms of volatility relative to the world market price but with higher distortionary costs than the efficiency trade-off when there is no volatility. In this case, it seems that countries value stability more than the distortionary costs. From figures 6 to 8 it appears that there are only few countries in the North-West quadrant for wheat and maize and that each of these countries are located close to the South-West quadrant. For rice, on the contrary, there are a significant number of countries located in the North-West quadrant with some of them close to the South-West quadrant (Djibouti, Nepal and India) and others much further away (Ghana, Gabon and Mongolia).
Governments of countries in the South-East have followed a price policy that kept the price distortion between the domestic and the international price limited, but volatility was higher than volatility in the international market. In this quadrant countries value the cost of the distortionary effects more than the adjustment costs for consumers and producers resulting from higher volatility. Figures 6 to 8 show that there are only two countries in this quadrant: Thailand in the case of rice and South Africa for maize.
The worst situation is in the North-East quadrant where countries have performed worse both in terms of volatility and efficiency. In these countries it should be possible to simultaneously reduce distortions and reduce volatility. There is a significant number of countries that is in the worst quadrant. It appears that especially
African countries are in the North-East quadrant, in particular for rice and maize for which we have the most observations.
Measuring inefficiency
To get a better perspective on the extent of the inefficiencies, we now calculate an indicator of inefficiency in this DV trade-off framework, with the methodology as explained in Section 5. 
Conclusion and Future Extensions
The question addressed in this paper is to what extent governments may have traded off price distortions for reduced volatility in intervening in agricultural and food markets. We developed a model to derive how much distortions a government would introduce when it cares about stability (i.e. if it wants to limit price volatility for domestic producers and consumers) in a situation with limited policy options. We showed that there is a trade-off between volatility and distortions in situations with limited policy options; and we identified a DV frontier as the optimal combination of distortions and stability for given international price shocks and various preferences.
We also showed that several countries have been able to reduce (short run) price volatility in the domestic markets while at the same time allowing structural (medium and long term) price changes to pass through to producers and consumers. One case is the Chinese rice market.
However, this is not the general (or average) case. The average "DV efficiency"
is rather low. For many countries, even when explicitly taking into account this tradeoff (and the benefits of reducing volatility) government policies appear far removed from the optimal distortion-volatility (DV) combination and that there appears to be, thus, much room for policy improvement.
There are several ways in which this analysis can be further refined, and several issues need to be taken into consideration when interpreting the results. One is to improve the empirical indicators by better correcting for differences in transportation costs. A second is related to the conceptual model and the availability and costs of using alternative instruments. Our assumption was that to address the volatility governments would intervene in markets and did not have other instruments, such as income support as an alternative option. A more elaborate model with multiple policy instruments (and their respective implementation costs and distortions) would improve the conceptual analysis. Finally, an issue we ignored is the spillover effects (and potentially secondary price effects) of domestic policies on international markets, an issue emphasized by e.g. Martin and Ivanic (2014) . Our analysis and results are complementary to the findings of these studies. 
